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要　旨
　第二次世界大戦の終結以来、日本は米国による安全保障と、1947年、米国によって記
された憲法に定められた項目と、その後の両同盟国間の合意によって補強された取り決
めに依存してきた。憲法第 9条は、日本が紛争へ参加することや旧来式の軍隊を創設す
ることを禁じている。日本の外交および安全保障政策に多大な影響を与えた国際的事件
とは、2001年 9月 11日の米国領土内におけるテロ攻撃と、ジョージWブッシュによる
アフガニスタンおよびイラクでの米国主導の戦争であった。2003年以降、自衛隊をイラ
ク戦争へ参加させるという日本の決定は、1947年に日本の平和主義憲法が採択された
後、日本国外への部隊派遣の歴史において、非常に画期的な一歩であった。この決定は、
2003年にイラクへの最後通告を通知したジョージWブッシュ米大統領への小泉純一郎首
相による非常に迅速な支援表明となり、多くの日本国民による反対にもかかわらず行わ
れたものであった。
　日本政府が法律を制定するための困難な障害を克服することに成功したことで、米国
との同盟を強化する新たな段階への道が開かれ、他の政党との安全保障協力においても
かつてない機会が開かれ、さらに緊急事態における対応能力も高まった。しかし、その
ような決定の背後にある日本の公式、非公式の目標とは何だったのか。迅速な意思決定
への道を開いた要因と理由とは。この動きが米国との同盟を強化することによって、あ
るいは米国の覇権から離れることによっても、日本が安全保障政策を発展させることに
どのように役立った。
　ただし、これらの決定の背後にある理由を包括的に理解するために、1945年前後の日
本の外交政策の背景と、この政策に影響を与える要因（世論、影響力のある人物、政治
家や官僚）、特に吉田ドクトリンの政治の調和に関する政策策定、そして 1991年の湾岸
戦争、2003年のイラク侵攻と占領への自衛隊の参加を通じて、これら政策の発展につい
て考察する。国内の政治的要因（特に多元主義者の外交政策決定における見解）と現実
主義に根ざした戦略的思考の両方に焦点を当てた政策は、目標を達成するため非常に効
果的である。
　本稿では、対外的地域課題、日米同盟、国内政治と、特に世論を、日本の外交政策決
定での可能要因と制限要因として位置づけ、イラク戦争における日本の政策対応の相違
に焦点を当て、論述する。また、日本の外交政策と全方位外交の現実主義と米国を通し
た防衛戦略と日本が「普通の国」になるため実行してきたことに関しても議論する。さ
らに、参加の決定につながった最も決定的な要因（エリート、リーダーシップ、小泉のトッ
プダウン政策プロセス、野党の役割）と自衛隊任務の本質に関する詳細についても、こ
の参加の背後にある日本の目標に関する明確な理解のため、取り組む予定である。
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INTRODUCTION
Certain moments in the nation's past constitute genuine "turning points," events that result in fundamental structural and 
policy changes that forever alter the nation's character.2 In Japan's modern history, two such turning points happened because 
of the United States; both had a lasting impact on Japan's foreign policy:
The first happened in 1853 when Commodore Matthew C. Perry's fleet of warships steamed into Tokyo Bay to force Japan to 
abandon its almost 250-year-old policy of sakoku, 鎖国 or "closed nation," and open its borders to western trade. Perry's arrival affected 
the issue of opening Japan to the foreign barbarians and the victory in the civil war of the so-called realists who understood that Japan 
had to defer to western military superiority.3 
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The civil war concluded with the "restoration" of the emperor and the beginning of the Meiji Era (1868- 1912). The new 
leadership dedicated efforts to rapid economic, political, and military development. Yukichi Fukuzawa (福澤 諭吉 ), who 
coined the national slogan of “to escape Asia”, was the foremost enlightenment thinker end educator of Meiji Japan, viewed 
Asia not only as a geographic entity, but as a barbaric state of civilization. He believed that national purpose of Meiji Japan 
was to enter Europe to become civilized.4
Enriching the nation, strengthening the military"(fukoku kyohei) 富国強兵 and "civilization and enlightenment" (bummei kaika) 
文明開化 were the two most important of several slogans adopted by Meiji oligarchs to symbolize their policy of catching up with the 
West and regaining sovereignty by negotiating an end to the unequal treaties.5
Military victories over China in the 1890s, a military alliance with England in 1902, the annexation of Korea in 1910, 
and entry into World War I on the side of the Allies together represented Japan's entry into the international society of 
"civilized," i.e., imperialist, nations.6 Inazo Nitobe (新渡戸稲造 )-, Japan’s representative to the League of Nations during 
the 1920s justified Japan's territorial and political expansion into Asian continent by portraying Japan as an agent of progress. 
By 1937 Japan was at war with China, had allied itself with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in 1940, and with the bombing 
of Pearl Harbor in 1941, set for itself an irrevocable policy of war and conquest under the rhetoric of creating a "Greater 
East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere”7 , which was presented as a justification for Japanese military expansion in the name of 
liberating Asia from Western imperialism and which brought on the disaster of World War II. 
By early 1945 the Americans began bombing Japanese cities, utterly devastating Tokyo with fire bombs, and, destroying 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August with atomic bombs. By war's end, the Japanese reckoned that some three million 
citizens had lost their lives during the war. The economy was in shambles, unemployment was high, food production was 
dangerously low, factory production had been crippled, the wartime government and its expansionist policies had been 
discredited, and aggressive nationalism had been exposed as a failed doctrine.8
Previous and subsequent events have created the right conditions for the start of the second turning point in Japan's 
modern history, which started with Japan's American Interlude, 1945-52, fashioned by Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers (SCAP), General Douglas Mac- Arthur. During those seven years SCAP policy laid the basis for Japan's foreign 
policy up until the present day. In a few words, America's foreign policy became Japan's; the occupation made Japan into a 
"junior partner" in an American-led alliance.9
Japan's economy had progressed from dependency to inter- dependency with the United States, in at least some areas, notably 
defense, economic diplomacy, and policies toward the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and South Africa, Japan has devised foreign policies 
independent of and even occasionally at odds with American policy stances.10
1. Japan’s Foreign Policy
　1.1 The Realism of Japan’s Foreign Policy 
Japan has pursued a special and unique policy since 1945 until the present because of the circumstances that 
accompanied and followed the US occupation to the country and the peaceful constitution, as well as the painful history 
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caused by Japan to Asian countries. 
The cornerstone of Japan's post-war foreign policy has been its bilateral relationship with the United States. The relationship was 
grounded in Japan's defeat in World War II, its terms largely defined during the American Occupation of Japan (1945-52), and cemented 
in the 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, amended somewhat in 1960 and renewed every 10 years. The importance of the U.S.-Japan tie 
was underscored by Okita Saburo 大来佐武郎 former Foreign Minister of Japan (1979-81), "Japan's relations with the entire world 
have been shaped by being under America's economic, social, and political wing”11 
This relationship is also described by Robert Scalapino12 as the "marriage", when he wrote in 1990; saying that the Japanese stake in 
the economic health of the United States is steadily gaining. Thus, a divorce is unthinkable even if the marriage remains troubled.13 The 
two previous metaphors (under America's wing and marriage) analogy bespeak a crucial truth about this relationship, and hence about 
Japan's foreign policy. The facts of this changing relationship give meaning to both metaphors. In the American military occupation of 
Japan, SCAP sought nothing less than to remake Japan's political and economic systems in the American image, and, with the beginning 
of the Cold War, to use Japan as the critical link in America's are of containment around the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of 
China.14 
Article 9, commonly known as the "peace clause," has helped make pacifism the ideology of most Japanese. It 
has shifted the sovereign responsibility for defense to Japan's military protector, the United States. Over the years the 
arrangement has nurtured a deep sense of dependency, even to the extent of legitimizing "freeridership" under the American 
hegemonic umbrella. Nevertheless, Article 9, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, formed the basis of Japan's foreign policy 
in the immediate postwar period.15
Japan’s prevailing postwar foreign policy strategy was what eventually developed into a Doctrine – the Yoshida Doctrine. The 
doctrine is named after Prime Minister Yoshida (1948-52), who skillfully guided Japan into a postwar era with new interests, new 
alliances, and new cleavages on the international scene. In addition to the primacy of the U.S.-alliance, the fundamental pillars of the 
Yoshida Doctrine have been minimal spending on defense, no involvement in international conflict, and, most importantly, a national 
concentration on economic reconstruction and industrialization to maximize the economic growth.16
Internally, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida had succeeded to make a grand bargain with the United States 
by establishing a security strategy that trod a line in domestic politics between what conservatives (rearmament) and 
progressives (unarmed neutrality) expected.  Security protection by the United States in return for bases meant that 
delivering something to both camps—security for the conservatives and a restriction on Japan’s military capacity for the 
progressives. Eventually, these politics developed into the orthodox consensus of Japan’s Cold War security policy that came 
to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine.17 
The establishment of the JSDF in 1954 and to the simultaneous signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and US-Japan 
Security Treaty in 1951 meant that Japan committed to minimal rearmament. This level of rearmament reassured East Asian 
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neighbors and domestic opposition that Japan was not retreading the path of becoming a significant regional military power 
and at the same time, satisfied the US and conservative pressures for a greater national defense effort. Through concluding 
the peace treaty, Japan was able to regain its independence and mitigate international and domestic pressures. Under the 
revised treaty of 1960, explicit guarantees from the United States in return for its provision to the US military of bases 
on Japanese territory. Moreover, the United States provided extended nuclear deterrence.18 As of fiscal 2015, Japan was 
shouldering 86.4 percent of the cost of stationing American troops in the country, according to Japanese Defense Ministry 
calculations.19
Democratization should not be overlooked when studying Japan's foreign policy because it has been the second of 
the occupation's two goals and a central to Japan's alliance with the United States. Occupation leaders operated on the 
assumption that democracies tend not to be aggressors in international politics, and therefore believed that democratization 
was as important as demilitarization in transforming Japan into a peace-loving state.20
In spite of the Japanese economy raced ahead in the 1960s and 1970s, national confidence remained elusive in Japan 
as a result of the impact of the shock of defeat in WWII. Public schools, for example, refrained from teaching children the 
national anthem and displaying the national flag at official ceremonies.21
Devoid of confidence, Japan had to look outside its borders to find a source for its new national identity. Whereas national 
identity is generally a celebration of the nation's distinctiveness, Japan's postwar national identity has been predicated on the need 
to be more like the West, especially the United States. The Japanese have regarded events that signified Japan’s acceptance into 
the Western international order as a major foreign policy accomplishment. Most notable among these has been Japan entry into the 
pillar organizations of Pax Americana: GATT, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and development, and the G-7.22
Japan’s foreign policy is described by (Green 2001) as “reluctant realism”23 Shokyokutekiriarism 消極的リアリズム 
and “resentful realism” Ikareruriarism 怒れるリアリズム by (Hughes 2015) which focus on emphasizing that Japan has 
been engaging in security – minded realpolitik foreign policy. Neorealist explains how the international system tends to 
find itself reverting to a balanced distribution of power when the previous balance is disturbed. The (defensive) neorealism 
explains that states’ goals are to maximize security (not power, which is the goal of offensive realists).24 A defensive 
realist foreign policy is a rational, realpolitik foreign policy. It does not maximize the pursuit of power because that would 
ultimately draw the attention of counter-balancers. Such a description certainly seems apt when applied to the immediate 
security concerns of Japanese foreign policy. Due to the increasing security threats over the past few decades, Japan found 
itself in an increasing insecure concern. North Korea has been major security concern because it has developed a weaponized 
nuclear program and tested ballistic missiles which could threat Japan’s territory with a nuclear strike. China’s surging 
economy and its accompanying rise in military spending over the past 25 years have occurred simultaneously with Japan’s 
two decades of economic stagnation. Intensification of historical controversies over Japan’s imperial past with China and 
the long-standing territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have put more pressures on Japan in terms of security 
threats. Beijing’s aggressive behavior, in particular in the maritime domain and it’s militarily and economically rising have 
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been both necessary and sufficient in terms of explaining Japan’s counterbalancing response.25
Neorealist analysis asserts that Japan will be increasingly cajoled by the deteriorating international security environment to convert 
its economic strength into military strength, and to aspire to great power status, even through the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
Japan’s principal reason for maintaining its anomalous international status as a relatively demilitarized nation in the postwar period has 
been its reliance on US hegemony and its concomitant opportunity to relegate to the United States the heavy lifting required to ensure 
its national security.26
While Constructivists argue that the primary drivers of Japan’s security choices are deeply embedded domestic norms, 
particularly pacifism and anti-militarism. These norms are diffused among policymaking institutions and Japanese society 
more widely and lead to an ingrained resistance to the Japanese state’s use of military power for national security ends or 
the glorification of the military. Constructivists contend that these norms are sufficiently strong to counteract international 
structural pressures, providing a high degree of continuity and resistance to the remilitarization of Japanese security policy—
even to the point of it's becoming an “immovable object”.27
This debate continues within the corridors of Japanese politicians, especially between the ruling party and the opposition 
parties. For decades, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party LDP has sought to amend Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution 
to bring it into line with the actual presence of Japanese naval, air and ground forces in the so-called Self-Defense Forces. 
Article 9 stipulates that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation” and “land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as another war potential, will never be maintained.” But the SDF, which boast one of the largest defense 
budgets in the world, is a potent military force. How is this legal? 28
Changing the Constitution requires two-thirds majorities in both chambers of the Diet29 and a simple majority in a 
national referendum. More than half of people in Japan oppose amending the nation’s postwar pacifist Constitution under 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government.56.0 percent opposed Abe’s drive for constitutional revision, while 32.2 expressed 
support.30
　1.2 The Elite and Policy Making in Japan 
So far as foreign policy making is concerned, the Japanese system, like the American system, has all the earmarks of an 
elitist democracy. Political conditions in Japan after 1945 allowed the emergence of many institutions and bodies involved in 
decision-making. However, the parties, personalities and institutions in force dominated the process of decision-making.
Pluralistic Japan's political system is becoming, foreign policy since the war, but most especially in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, 
has been made by the Prime Minister, his cabinet, a few factional leaders within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and high-
ranking bureaucrats of the most powerful ministries, especially International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Finance (MOF). By the 
1980s, policy-oriented rank and file LDP politicians, aligned in so-called zoku 族 (tribes), as well as bureaucrats from other ministries, 
began playing more important, if less conspicuous, roles in the policy process. Interest groups such as big business and farmers defer to 
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the governing elites whose record in promoting economic nationalism, as embodied in the Yoshida Doctrine, has served them and the 
nation profitably for so many years.31
The LDP was formed in November 1955 with the merger of two conservative parties — the Japan Democratic Party and 
the Liberal Party.32 Since then, the party has almost continuously been in power with some exceptions of a period between 
1993 and 1994, and again from 2009 to 2012.33 The LDP was divided into factions and some of them were rivals; the prime 
minister had to make coalitions with one or more to come to power, and then appoint some of their members to the cabinet 
in order to ensure the party would support the government.
There were the zoku (‘policy tribes’) composed of veteran National Diet members holding party, parliament and government 
positions in particular policy areas. Before reaching the cabinet, all legislation had to go through the party’s policy organ, the Policy 
Affairs Research Council, with its multiple policy divisions overseen by these policy tribes’ zoku, who to a large extent dominated 
policymaking.34
This means that foreign policy is generally made with as little regard for public opinion as politically feasible. This does 
not mean that the public is quiescent on controversial issues, nor does it mean that elites always ignore public sentiment 
when making policy.35
There are certain famous examples of elite control over foreign policy in Japan. One of them is the conflict in the 
parliament in 1960 between right and left wings over ratification of a revised version of the original security treaty in 1951. 
The right wing objected to the treaty as foreign-imposed, the left objected to any military relationship with the leading 
parties of the Cold War because they felt that it would result in Japan being targeted in some future nuclear war. After a 
severe debate in the parliament, Prime Minister Kishi used his LDP majority in the Diet to ramrod ratification of the Treaty. 
Another example is Japan's policy towards China. Despite strong business between the two countries support for establishing 
diplomatic relations with China ever since the 1950s, Japan did not open up relations until after the United States first 
approached the People's Republic of China in 1971.36
　1.3 Omnidirectional Diplomacy and Hedging towards the US
One of the consequences of World War II was the widespread belief that Japan lacks what is called the “checking 
mechanism”.
 After the war, the vast majority of the Japanese people came to understand that they had been victims of their own state, that 
the militarists has usurped the power of the state and that there had been no resistance to the militaries determination to mobilize the 
population for war.  For a society that lacks a tradition of effective political dissent, one of the main lessons learned from the experience 
of World War II is to consciously avoid the espousal of any one principle of action. This helps to explain why, for example, Tokyo 
pursued an omnidirectional diplomacy in the 1970s, thus damping Cold War loyalties despite Japan’s unquestionable location in the US 
camp.37
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 Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987) regularly, reminded the Japanese of the need to establish checking 
mechanism when he pushed for substantial increase in defense spending during the 1980s with encouragement of U.S. 
President Ronald Reagan.38
Despite the progress of the strategic relationship between the United States and Japan, the relationship has undergone 
such strong shocks that Japan made feel weak. Nixon’s visiting to China in 1971 and leaving Japan, the last major power 
withholding diplomatic recognition from China, and imposing a short-term embargo on soybean exports to Japan are 
considered as serious shocks to Japan. The two "oil shocks" of the 1970s has exacerbated Japan's sense of vulnerability and 
heightened its historic sense of "victim consciousness”.39
Therefore, these shocks were countered by Japan with economic or "resource diplomacy," also more broadly known as 
"multilateral diplomacy," "omnidirectional diplomacy," and "comprehensive security," all terms used by Japanese foreign 
policy analysts to refer to the pragmatic and necessary steps such as diversifying various Japanese dependencies and trading 
relationships, developing overseas' resources, stockpiling crucial commodities at home, and currying favor with primary 
producers by providing generous "development assistance" in the form of grants and loans.40 Therefore, Japan's typical 
position has been to "separate politics from economics" (seikei bunri) 政経分離 . 
During the periods - 1968-72, 1976-78, and to the present-the American predominantly military notion of security and the Japanese 
predominantly economic notion of security have come into conflict. But because the Japanese tend to believe that their economic 
security rests on American defense security guarantees and the larger economic benefits gained from the bilateral trading relationship, 
the Americans invariably enjoy strong leverage in negotiations over trade and other disputes.41
 
During the Cold War, a consensus had formed around the idea that Japan's security should be sought through economics 
and "peace diplomacy” heiwagaiko 平 和 外 交 . The declining efficacy of Japan's economics-first approach to national 
security has arguably boosted the appeal of political-military normalization.42 Japan’s vulnerability to China’s long-term rise 
as a strategic competitor in Asia makes concessions to the U.S. the lesser burden to bear.43 Due to its powerful neighbors, 
Japan is also considering “hedging”.44 
Japan’s commitment to the Yoshida Doctrine and alignment with the United States has not been without strategic costs, what in 
international relations literature are referred to as the risks of abandonment and entrapment. Abandonment entails risk that the United 
States as a global superpower with wider-ranging strategic interests than just the defense of Japan might overlook its security treaty 
duties, or even abdicate them entirely. Entrapment has long been a constant and greater fear, in that the United States might pursue 
policies that generate war in the region which Japan would be inevitably drawn into, or even pressure Japan to dispatch the JSDF 
overseas to support US-led expeditionary warfare.45
 The Abe administration’s strategy, therefore, has been focusing on reinforcing the alliance with the United States to 
ensure that it remains at the centre of Japanese security policy. Japan has been consistently concerned about America’s 
commitment to Japanese security, pushing, for instance, for an explicit understanding that the disputed Senkaku Islands 
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come under the US‒Japan security treaty.46 Such concerns have also caused Japan to hedge against US abandonment by 
attempting to forge better relations elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific.47
Japan tried its best to practice a policy of separating economics from politics that is, keeping commercial relations 
unfettered by political or ideological differences.48 But, during its economic negotiations with the US, for an instance, and as 
a result of the US trade deficit with Japan, Japan fears the US security pressures of threatening to withdraw American forces 
stationed in Japan. This was clear after the US President Trump adopting the policy of "America First" and when he referred 
in July 2019 to the 1951 Japan-U.S. security treaty as “one-sided".49
　1.4 Japan's Defense Expenditures
Article 9 gave rise to a range of many antimilitaristic prohibitions including: the 1967 Three Non-Nuclear Principles (not to 
produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons); the 1967 and 1976 bans on the export of arms and military technology; the 1969 
National Diet resolution on the peaceful use of space, and the 1976 1 percent of Gross National Product GNP limit on defense 
expenditure.50
Japan's defense expenditures have always been small as a proportion of its Gross National Product (GNP). This limit of 
1% was honored by the Prime Ministers until Prime Minister Nakasone who barely exceeded the limit in 1987.51 
The most accepted features of Japan's defense profile which constitutes the first reason for keeping defense expenditures 
low are: a ban on export of arms and military technology, the "three nonnuclear principles; and the periodic reaffirmations 
by a succession of Prime Ministers to abide by Article 9 of the Constitution. The other aspect of Japanese foreign policy 
constitutes a second reason for keeping defense expenditures low: the need to reassure former victims of Japanese military 
aggression that history will not repeat itself. American pressure on Japan to assume greater responsibility for its defense has 
usually coincided with a comparative weakening of the American economy vis-A-vis Japan's. As a general rule, the higher 
the American trade deficit with Japan, the louder and more frequent are American calls for Japan to beef up its defense.52 
The further point is that in the U.S.-Japan defense relationship, political and economic issues had gotten intertwined, which 
remains the situation today. Japan has acquiesced to pay for American troops stationed in its territory, rather than build up 
militaries solely on its own. Japan paid 0.5% of its GDP in 2007on American troops in Japan.53
In 2004, Japan provided for American troops direct support of $3.2 billion and indirect support worth $1.18 billion, 
offsetting as much as 74.5 percent of the total cost. Defense Minister Tomomi Inada said in 2019 that Japan paid about 
¥191 billion in 2015, about 86.4 percent of the total cost. Meanwhile, U.S. Forces said that the approximate cost of the 
U.S. presence in Japan is $5.5 billion, based on the 2017 Operation and Maintenance Overview by the Office of the U.S. 
Undersecretary of Defense.54 The Trump administration is seeking up to a fivefold increase in what Japan pays to support U.S. 
military forces based in Japan. Trump has long complained that Japan was not contributing enough to its defense and that the 
U.S. military was being asked to shoulder an unfair burden.55
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The Japanese government every year allocates a huge amount of Japanese taxpayers’ money for the U.S. military-related 
expenditures including the Omoiyari Yosan (思いやり予算 , lit. sympathy budget)56. Among the top 10 high-value U.S. 
bases, eight are situated in Japan including Kadena Air Base in Okinawa. U.S. bases in Japan carried a total value of 98.2 
billion dollars in 2018, the highest among host nations.57
　1.5 Japan’s pursuing to be a Normal State
The Yoshida Doctrine did not offer much direction on how Japan might pursue a more active international role as an 
advanced economy. At the same time, Americans continued to allege free riding on Japan’s part, especially in relation to the 
1991 Gulf War, where Japan was disparaged as only delivering ‘checkbook diplomacy’.58
Such failings set off a new political debate in Japan about how the country should approach international politics and the 
US alliance in the post–Cold War era. This new debate focused on the idea of becoming a ‘normal nation’ ‘普通の国 ’ (futsū 
no kuni), within both the context of the US alliance and wider international relations. Some of the LDP members called for 
taking more responsibilities of a normal nation. They urged Japan of having a strongly globalist vision that loosened the 
restrictions on Japan’s ability to do more on security matters (e.g. peacekeeping), and in this case, Japan should be closely 
tied to international institutions such as the United Nations rather than just the US alliance”.59
Some major events happened elsewhere in the world undermined the Japanese pursue towards normalization such as 
the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998 which exposed Japan’s lack of influence in global institutions. 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Japanese security concerns quickly shifted toward enhancing the alliance cooperation 
and America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.60
Conservative Japanese politicians, led by Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi between 2001 and 2006, began 
implementing a revisionist idea of Japan as a normal nation, focusing on Japan’s role in the alliance which is sometimes 
being described as ‘de facto collective self-defense’. Koizumi pushed Japan toward supporting US activities by passing an 
anti-terrorism special measures law and dispatching Japanese ships to the Indian Ocean to support US forces operating in 
Afghanistan, and passing the Iraq Special Measures Law and dispatched Self-Defense Forces to Iraq.61 These actions were 
part of a wider revision of Japan’s security role, with the focus not only on increasing capabilities but also on reforming 
institutions and changing norms.62
Koizumi had taken a hard stance towards China and South Korea on issues of history. His government took a robust 
stance against China over its territorial claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and against South Korea’s claim to the 
Takeshima/Tokdo Islands. Moreover, Japan sought to balance China's rise with a build-up of the Japanese Self-Defense 
Force’s capabilities and tightening alliance ties with the United States. Koizumi might argue that he merely asserted Japan’s 
national interests as any ‘normal’ state would and that he did not seek confrontation with Japan’s neighbors.63
In the same context, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reiterated his demand that the Diet discusses his Liberal Democratic 
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Party’s proposals for constitutional amendments which include defining the roles of the Self-Defense Forces in the 
Constitution’s war-renouncing Article 9.64
　1.6 Japan's position towards the US call to collective self - defense and the war against terrorism  
The Gulf War to liberate Kuwait in 1991 exposed the limitations of Tokyo’s Cold War modus operandi_ securing its 
overseas interests through the exercise of economic power. Due to increasing pressures by the international community 
in 1991 to contribute support to the war, the Japanese government attempted to pass enabling legislation.65 But the Diet 
balked at the prospect of SDF dispatch, forcing the government to withdraw the bill. As a consequence, Japan underwrote 
20 percent of the war’s expense, yet received neither gratitude nor respect, and just media accusations of “checkbook 
diplomacy” satsutabagaiko 札束外交 .66 The Gulf War’s ramifications extended beyond Japan’s sense of wounded national 
pride. Tokyo feared for the bilateral alliance’s future credibility, for why would Washington expend blood and treasure to 
protect a fair-weather ally?67
The Bush administration came into office with high hopes for strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. The goal was a 
closer and more equal partnership on the model of that between America and Britain.68 From Washington's perspective, there 
were several key markers of progress toward this partnership. One priority was Japan's willingness to allow its SDF to stand 
shoulder to shoulder with U.S. forces in regional military conflicts, including those geographically remote from Japan. 69
The most obvious impediment was the continued appeal of pacifism as manifest in a widespread aversion to military force, support 
for Japan's "self-defense only" posture, and acceptance of its constitutional ban on collective defense. Article 9 of Japan's 1947 "Peace 
Constitution," which renounces the use of military force to settle international disputes, is interpreted to permit self-defense but prohibit 
collective defense.70
The American administration had urged Japan to revise the constitution to eliminate that obstacle because from the 
American standpoint, the issue was less constitutional than political and psychological- namely Japan’s willingness to 
share the burdens of upholding international peace and security. The question became whether or not Japanese attitude had 
matured to the point where the SDF would be deployed in the common defense if crises similar to Gulf war 1991 arose.71 
In 1992, Tokyo relaxed its collective self defense ban to allow SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations. In 
1997, Japan had revised its defense cooperation guidelines with the United States to enable the SDF to provide logistical 
support to U.S. forces in the event of military contingencies near Japan. In 1998, Tokyo agreed to participate in joint research 
with the United States on a theater missile defense system intended to protect Japan and U.S. bases located there. In 1999 
when the SDF "fired its first shot in anger in an encounter with a North Korean "spy boat." In 2000, the Diet established 
bodies to look into constitutional revision with a view to eventually legitimizing Japan's participation in collective self 
defense activities.72 
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution does not mention the right to self-defense, regardless of whether it is the right to individual 
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self-defense or the right to collective self-defense. However, the Japanese Government interprets that Japan has the right to individual 
self-defense. As for the right to collective self-defense, the Japanese Government had interpreted until 2014 that Japan had the right 
to collective self-defense as a member of the United Nations, but could not exercise its right. However, in July 2014, Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe changed the interpretation of Article 9 so that Japan could exercise the right to collective self-defense.73
It’s worthy to differentiate here between collective security and collective self-defense. Collective self-defense is authorized, 
along with individual self-defense, by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Put simply, if a country in the international system has 
suffered an armed attack, then any other country has the right, but not the duty, to use armed force against the aggressor in reliance upon 
the principle of collective self-defense. The only preconditions, in addition to the determination that an armed attack has occurred or is 
irrevocably in motion, are that the use of force is deemed necessary, that the force is proportionate to that used in the attack or the threat 
posed, and that it is immediate. In contrast, collective security involves the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and 
security, as authorized by the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII, and specifically Article 42, of the U.N. Charter. There need be 
no “armed attack” as a conditional precedent, but merely a determination by the Security Council that there is a threat to the peace, a 
breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, such that the use of force or other measures are required to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.74
During the years 2001–2005, the Diet laid the groundwork for amending Japan’s constitution. In 2005, a majority of the 
Lower House panel favored amending Article 9, but the Upper House commission failed to reach a similar consensus. While 
both Japan’s major political parties (the LDP and DPJ) advocate amending Article 9, inter-party (and intra-party) differences 
exist as to the nature of specific changes. Although both parties recognize the need to stipulate the right of self-defense, the 
overseas use of armed force and the prohibition on collective self defense remain items of contention.75
After September 11, one representative poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun found that 81 percent of respondents were “uneasy that a 
terrorist incident may occur in Japan like in the U.S.” That the public responded strongly to September 11 should be expected. Having 
experienced a sarin attack at the hand of Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, Japan’s population was already sensitive to the threat of terrorism.76
Japan reacted with shock to the terrorist attacks of 11, September 2001, and immediately focused on the implications 
of the attacks on the U.S.-Japan alliance. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro quickly set up an emergency task force in the 
prime minister’s office within 45 minutes of the attacks and decided upon a series of responses.77 After a week, on September 
19, the Koizumi cabinet proceeded by proposing to send SDF airplanes and ships to assist the United States, strengthen 
the protection of the U.S. bases in Japan and emergency economic aid to Pakistan and India to ensure their support. On 
September 25, Koizumi met with President Bush in the U.S. where he assured his intentions of a speedy implementation 
of the plan. On the same day, the ruling parties agreed upon an outline for a law: support for the U.S. in the Indian Ocean, 
humanitarian assistance to refugees, and the prime ministerial decision of dispatch of the SDF.78 As the Koizumi cabinet 
let the law be based on UN resolutions, the law would not inflict constitutional challenges. The law passed in the Diet in 
only three weeks.79 The law stands out for the swiftness with which it was enacted. In Japan, laws of any kind are rarely 
enacted in less than a month. In the case of bills covering sensitive military and constitutional issues, such rapid passage is 
unprecedented.80
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Prime Minister Koizumi identified the terrorist attack on US as ‘Japan’s own security issue’81. Koizumi ordered the 
dispatch of six ASDF transport aircraft to deliver relief supplies to Afghan refugees in Pakistan, ships of the MSDF, to the 
Arabian Sea to provide rear-area logistical support for U.S. military operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan.82
The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill, which is introduced in early October 2001 and swiftly debated and enacted 
into law on October 29, permits SDF members to fire their weapons only in self-defense. It is limited in applicability to U.S. 
military actions taken in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, and to two years from the time of enactment in 
October 2001 (i.e., till October 2003), with one two-year extension permitted if approved by the Diet.83 
The threat of terrorism appears to have partly motivated Japan’s security behavior. Throughout the months following 
September 11, Koizumi reiterated that terrorism endangered the “lives and lifestyles of the people all over the world and the 
peace and security of all countries”. He also described the war on terror as Japan’s “own challenge”.84 
The prime minister’s apparent sense of alarm belied the Japanese government’s mixed sentiment: only certain elements within the 
bureaucracy considered Al Qaeda a direct security threat. In contrast to other major powers—Britain and Russia, for example—Japan 
had never experienced Islamic terrorism. Tokyo’s cordial relations with the Arab world and calibrated neutrality in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict rendered Japan an unlikely target. To many officials and Diet members, terrorism therefore imperiled Japanese nationals abroad, 
but posed a minimal danger to the Japanese homeland. The Japanese government did not consider Al Qaeda and its ilk an immediate 
threat.85
In terms of Japanese public opinion and the wars in Iraq, according to Cabinet Office poll in February 1991, in the midst 
of the Gulf War, most respondents (56.4%) chose the ‘Middle East issue’, as the one that concerned them with regard to 
Japan’s peace and security. However, the results changed significantly in the next poll in 1994; the concerns on Middle East 
issue dropped by two-thirds to 18.2%. In the poll in 2003, after the September 2002 Koizumi visit to Pyongyang, as many as 
74.4% of respondents identified the Korean Peninsula as their primary concern. The geographical proximity of the Peninsula 
may have made Japan’s public concern over national security more realistic than the Soviet threat during the Cold War 
period86 or the developments in the Middle East (wars of Iraq). This reflects the fact that Japanese public opinion is heavily 
influenced by factors that may pose a threat by location for its region, and here is the reference to North Korea, China.
2. Japan's Motives for Participation in the Iraq War
The Iraq War led to the most dramatic shift in Japan’s defense policy. Three of the four factors:(external threats, Washington’s 
influence, executive leadership, and generational change) that make up the transitional model—foreign threats, U.S. policy, and 
executive leadership—significantly influenced Japan’s response to the removal of Saddam Hussein and post- conflict reconstruction.87
The security concerns from the threats of North Korea were prevailing in Japan in 2003 and Japan worked with its major 
allies to prevent any development of threats from happening and simultaneously took steps to expand its defensive military 
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capabilities. The Japanese public was increasingly fearful of a missile attack. But, in general, Japan has no interest in seeing 
the crisis with North Korea lead to conflict and maintained in 2003 its position that the North had to be convinced to give up 
its nuclear ambitions, the issue needed to be resolved diplomatically.88
In 2003, Koizumi and others in the LDP have taken full advantage of rising public fears of North Korea, while at the 
same time using the pretext of needing to cooperate with Japan’s American ally, to cross several security thresholds.89 
Koizumi surprised many by his strong support for America’s preemptive invasion of Iraq, and by mid-year, he had pledged 
to send troops from Japan’s Self-Defense Force (SDF) to assist in postwar reconstruction. Public opinion in Japan was 
against these decisions as it was deeply worried about sending combat troops to an insecure area.90
Economically, the overall economy in Japan began to slow down at the beginning of 2003. Against the backdrop of the 
regional SARS epidemic and the disruption caused by the conflict in Iraq, economic growth during the first quarter of 2003 
was essentially zero. Economists feared that Japan was about to enter a period of recession. Deflation continued to beset 
Japan. The monthly unemployment rate hit a new historic high in January, 5.5%, and then remained at 5.4% through July.91 
Since entering office, Koizumi has offered a different solution: reform and deregulation of the economic system through 
focusing on privatizing some government functions and reducing stifling bureaucratic regulations, raising the slogan of 
“reform without sacred cows”. Thus, he faced a political crisis. His public support has eroded, falling below the 50% mark 
early in the year, well off the 80% approval ratings he enjoyed two years ago. The opposition led by the Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ), attacked Koizumi’s lack of progress. Koizumi came also under constant attack from within the LDP’s “old 
guard,” to backtrack on reform.92
After the election of the LDP in 2003, Koizumi received a majority from the LDP Diet members, winning 194 out of 
357 votes, and won the solid backing of the local chapters, where 205 out of 300 votes went to him, which enabled him 
eventually to stay in power till September 2006.93
Legislatively, Japan went a step further in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan by passing the Anti-Terrorism Special 
Measures Law (Tero Taisaku Tokubetsu Sochi Ho) テロ対策特別措置法 and dispatching the Maritime SDF to the Indian 
Ocean to provide logistical support for the U.S. military and NATO forces.94 Therefore, from a historical perspective, not 
dispatching the SDF to Iraq while clearly supporting the military action there could have been seen as inconsistent, given the 
flow of the preceding events.95
Koizumi’s strong position came in spite of numerous polls that showed that nearly 80% of the Japanese public opposed 
American invasion to Iraq.96 Although Koizumi had posed as the champion of the people’s will on the reform issue, he 
justified his stance towards the war and arguing: “there are times when we might make a mistake if we follow public 
opinion.” In another telling comment, his chief cabinet secretary, Fukuda Yasuo, argued also that “U.S. public opinion cannot 
be ignored,” in reference to the obvious American anger at the French for their lack of support.97
In January 2002, President Bush made a State of the Union address, containing a phrase, ‘the Axis of Evil’, to condemn 
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Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, for ‘arming to threaten the peace of the world.’98
Two weeks later, the president visited Japan. In his speech at the Japanese parliament on 18 February, he praised Japan’s 
contribution to the war in Afghanistan, but did not mention anything about his plans for Iraq. On that day, Bush had a private meeting 
with Prime Minister Koizumi, which was joined only by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Deputy Minister 
Toshiyuki Takano. According to a media report released four months after the meeting, the president told Koizumi that the United States 
would attack Iraq. In his response, Koizumi told him that Japan would always be with the United States in the war against terrorism.99
If this report is accurate, as early as February 2002, over a year before the campaign began, the US intention to attack 
Iraq and Japan’s support for it were exchanged by the two national leaders.100
When the US forces opened fire on the Saddam’s regime on 19 March 2003, Japan’s public opinion was sharply split 
on whether the Japanese government should support the US attack. Immediately after the attack began, Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi declared Japan’s support for the United States.101
"Now, at this juncture, based on such thoughts, I understand and support the engagement in the military action by the 
United States”102. Koizumi’s declaration of support indicated that Japan stood firmly on the U.S. side in the war, in light of 
Iraq’s repeated violations of some 16 U.N. resolutions and lack of cooperation in weapons inspections.103
Koizumi’s strong support of the U.S. invasion of Iraq was in some ways inevitable, as most people in Japan recognize the need for 
American cooperation to resolve the North Korean issue. At the same time, Koizumi seems intent on using this unique opportunity to 
fulfill his long-time desire to move Japan toward a more active foreign policy role.104 Koizumi stayed loyal to his decision of support 
throughout his period as prime minister.105
After the end of major combat operations in Iraq on 2 May, 2003, the Koizumi administration swiftly moved on a plan to 
dispatch the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq to provide reconstruction assistance. Within three months, Koizumi managed 
to pass (The Law Concerning the Special Measures on the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities) in the 
Diet.106 The bill authorized the SDF to carry more significant weapons than had been the case in previous peacekeeping 
operations, but also stipulated that the troops could not use their weapons unless attacked.107 Because of the growing 
controversy over the issue, the prime minister in late August decided to delay the proposed troop dispatch. Originally, 
Koizumi had hoped to send the troops before the end of the calendar year, but he decided to wait until the security situation 
had stabilized.108
　2.1 The JSDF Engagement in Iraq and the role of the Japan- U.S. Coalition 
The United States has no better friend in the world than Japan.109 The Iraq dilemma had raised many questions on the 
U.S.-Japan relationship; the degree Japan was willing to support its most important ally; terrorism; threats of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD; biological and chemical); security and stability in the Middle East; as well as the constitutional 
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restrictions on the use of force collective self defense, and the operational use of the SDF.110 Koizumi’s decision to dispatch 
the SDF to Iraq in an ambiguous security condition created massive attention from media, discussions, and critique. 
Koizumi, relying on the public support for his premiership, was ready to fight politicians and bureaucrats, but only so with 
strong support from the electorate.111
Scholars from the realist school, especially structural realism or neorealism, argue that Japan must play an international role in the 
framework of the US Japan alliance. During the Cold War era, Washington held the consensus that Japan was a very important element 
for the US global strategy to contain the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War era, however, the US–Japan alliance lost a clear common 
goal. Facing an uncertain security environment in Asia, such as Chinese emergence as a military power and North Korean brinkmanship 
diplomacy, Japan needed US presence in Asia. In order to maintain the alliance, Japan needs to take a more active role to revitalize the 
bilateral alliance.112
While the liberalist scholars, who emphasize international cooperation and interdependence, focus on the change in 
reactions from Asian countries towards the developments of the Japanese movements. Both realist and liberalist assertions 
assume a ‘rational actor model’ that ignores domestic political factors.113
Japan's reaction to the Gulf Crisis serves as an object lesson to the problems, limits, and perils of Japan's foreign policy. 
Gulf Crisis exposes Japan as a reactive state," which is more likely to change its policy because of outside pressure than due 
to strategic concerns. The Crisis shows the face of a wealthy weakling, uncertain, timid, slow-responding, conflicted, and 
vulnerable to outside pressure, especially American.114 Obviously, this is not the "face" projected by Prime Minister Kaifu 
when he told a Japanese symposium in Tokyo on 25 June 1990, "From now on Japan will go out into the world and if there 
is a need, if there is a request from another party, we should not hesitate in meeting it"115.
A good lesson Japan learned from the Gulf War was the importance of quickly labeling this situation as a crisis.116 Due to 
failing to identify the Gulf Crisis of August 1990 as a “significant emergency, the issue was handled by the Foreign Ministry 
under normal diplomatic channels and not by the Cabinet Security Affairs Office which was designed to operate interagency 
coordination in an emergency. This significantly delayed Japan’s crisis response.117
Due to the unpromising prospects for the equivocal and gradual change in the Japanese foreign politics, the Bush 
administration's hopes for speeding the development of a more "mature partnership" with Japan depended heavily on 
the emergence of a strong leader willing and able to pull it in that direction.118 Koizumi's election as LDP leader and 
Japan's prime minister in April 2001 was greeted with enthusiasm by many American observers. They were impressed 
by his extraordinary popularity with the Japanese public and by his talk about implementing bold economic reforms and 
revitalizing the American alliance. He also won plaudits for his advocacy of constitutional revision and reconsideration of 
the ban on collective self defense, as well as for his personal rapport with President Bush.119
With Japan willing to play the role of dutiful ally, the Bush administration seemed quite happy with the state of U.S.-Japan relations. U.S. 
officials praised Japan lavishly throughout the year, with Ambassador Howard Baker labeling the country America’s most dependable ally 
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after the United Kingdom. U.S. officials even managed to hide their disappointment over Japan’s decision to delay the troop deployment.120
U.S. officials have pushed very strongly behind the scenes for Japan to put “boots on the ground.” Even if this 
deployment does not amount to much in terms of military capabilities, the U.S. desperately wants the symbolic value of 
adding a major participant to the “coalition of the willing”.121
The 11 September 2001 attacks on U.S. transformed Japan’s domestic and international environment, providing 
Koizumi with unprecedented opportunity to launch high-profile initiatives to expand Japan’s international military 
role. The graphic horror of the attacks inspired a wave of solidarity with the U.S. and its war on terrorism including the 
international military action against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.122 Koizumi was clearly pursuing “change within continuity” 
approach renzokuseinonakanohenkaku 連続性の中の変革 .123 Washington felt surprised and pleased by Koizumi success 
in delivering an unexpectedly robust Japanese contribution in Afghanistan. It seemed an opportunity at hand to accelerate 
Japan’s evolution into stronger and more self-confident ally.124
The Bush administration’s game plan for nudging it in that direction wisely eschewed heavy-handed external pressure in favor of 
quiet diplomacy and positive reinforcement-an approach that enabled Koizumi to stress the independent character of his imitative and 
parry charges of subservience to Washington.125
Japan hosted an international conference about Afghanistan in 2002, and extended the antiterrorism legislation of 2001 
for stationing Maritime Self-Defense Forces ships in the Indian Ocean. The looming prospect of the U.S. military action 
against Iraq inspired active discussion within the Koizumi government of the ways that Japan might support the United 
States.126 The Bush Administration’s division of the international community in allies and foes (“either with us or against 
us”) tekikamikataka 敵か味方か and its unilateral approach to invading Iraq without the Security Council endorsement 
brought complicated ethical, military and political considerations to all of the traditional allies of the U.S. including Japan.127
Highly salient bilateral trade frictions would have made Japan a prime target for retaliation if it had abstained from 
supporting the U.S. war effort. Indeed, in September 1990, the House of Representatives voted 370 to 53 to start withdrawing 
troops from Japan unless Tokyo increased its “burden-sharing” contributions to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Congressional action 
was a reflection of popular sentiment; 70% of American poll respondents said Japan was not providing satisfactory support 
for the Gulf War effort.128 After the Americans made their displeasure, Japan announced it would contribute funding to the 
coalition against Iraq in 1990. The initial announcement referred to a figure of only $10 million. The next day, following an 
extremely frosty American response, the Ministry of Finance came out with an amended figure of $1 billion. Anxious not to 
alienate the Americans any further, the Japanese government later supplemented this amount with further funding, ultimately 
bringing the total to some $13 billion.129
There was a sense in Washington that Japan should share in the risk and toil by making a human contribution as well. 
One factor driving this desire was that the failure by Japan to make any personnel contribution might provoke a wave of 
resentment in the U.S. that would put the alliance at risk.130 Thus, Japanese officials were made to understand that a Japanese 
failure to contribute would have grave consequences for the alliance. As a top Japanese diplomat warned early in the crisis, 
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“The gap between what the Americans want and what the Japanese are willing to do is simply enormous.”131 By 2001, this 
enormous gap seemed to have largely closed, primarily because U.S. expectations about a post-September 11 Japanese 
contribution to U.S. military operations had greatly diminished.132
Japanese politics seems full of ambivalence towards the U.S because of many reasons. First, the U.S. defeated Japan in 
the war, used two nuclear bombs against it, occupied it for about 7 years and wrote its Constitution. The U.S. still has many 
military bases on the Japanese territories. Therefore, those nationalist attempts to strengthen Japan internationally may find 
it peculiar that the U.S. still plays a vital role in Japanese security133. Second, the fear of entrapment has led to arguments 
that Japan should reduce the alliance commitment. The third reason, the fear of abandonment may lead to a desire to 
independently be able to protect Japan but may lead also to calls for a strengthened relationship with the U.S.134
There were some pressing factors that led to the speedy engagement, including external and domestic factors, and could 
be identified by four major factors. Of the four factors, (external threats, Washington’s influence, executive leadership, and 
generational change), only U.S. policy and prime ministerial leadership exerted a decisive influence and motivated Japan’s 
security behavior in the aftermath of September 11.135
Behind closed doors, the United States in effect did call upon Japan to “show the flag.” The humiliation of the 1991 Gulf War and 
subsequent milestones in Japan’s defense policy led Tokyo to internalize U.S. and international expectations. As a result, officials in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the JDA challenged constitutional restraints in their haste to demonstrate Japan’s commitment 
to the bilateral alliance and global security.136
In addition to the above regional and international factors, and circumstances surrounding, which led Japan to the 
participation of the United States in the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, it is necessary to address the internal affairs, whether 
at the grassroots, parliamentary, partisan or even personal levels of leaders and bureaucrats, which contributed to preparing 
the conditions for such participation.
2.2 Domestic Factors:
　2.2.1 Balance of power in the Diet
A shift in the balance of power in the Diet would seem to offer the best proximate reason for the government’s ability to 
enact the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law authorizing, among other things, the dispatch of the MSDF to the Arabian 
Sea and The Law Concerning the Special Measures on the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities, to 
dispatch SDF to Iraq.
　2.2.2 Leadership137 
From April 2001 to August 2006, Koizumi was the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) prime minister in Japan. Compared 
to the fast-changing cabinets of the 1990s, this stability was a remarkable achievement. Through four national elections, 
Koizumi guided the LDP to success.138 The LDP had never seen such an ardent fighter against their consensus politics. 
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With his provocative, conflict-oriented political style, Koizumi attracted massive media attention. He changed the rules of 
the political game within the LDP through neglecting factions when appointing and reshuffling his cabinets and exercising 
strong top-down leadership.139 Koizumi has made significant structural reforms. In addition to the government reforms, 
public corporations reforms, he acted upon a populist worldview, in which he presented himself as the spokesman of the 
people in a struggle with the Japanese elite. In foreign policy, Koizumi supported the U.S. War on Terrorism and sought to 
participate in the war and occupation efforts.140 The 2005 September Lower House election resulted in a landslide victory for 
Koizumi’s party – among the best election in LDP’s history.141
 Koizumi was a politician with libertarian beliefs in human beings and society, with an emphasis on individual freedom 
which led to a neoliberal attitude toward the Japanese state and markets. Koizumi’s structural reforms were concerned with 
shrinking the size of the government, increasing competition in the public and private sector and dealing with the existence 
of substantial amounts of bad debt.142 Two of the most important policy proposals were Koizumi’s attempts to privatize the 
public highway companies and the postal services.143 Through his structural reform program, Koizumi was successful to 
the extent that he remained a popular politician and the undefeated leader of the LDP for over five years. To stay in power 
for this long without much formal support in the LDP, but with high support among the electorate and in the media, was 
somewhat of an achievement.144
Koizumi was a candidate for the presidency of the LDP three times, but twice he failed to achieve the highest number of votes – in 
1995 and 1998. The third time, in April 2001, Koizumi somewhat surprisingly won the internal LDP leadership election. Koizumi went 
on to lead the LDP through four parliamentary elections – with the 2005 election as the largest triumph.145
Koizumi thought that the main challenge to restoring the greatness of the Japanese economy was the unhealthy 
relationship between politicians, bureaucrats and vested interests. He was even ready to destroy his own party if the LDP 
politicians did not support his reform agenda,146 repeating that important reform of the LDP and the Japanese economy were 
two sides of the same coin.147
Moreover, Koizumi continued criticizing the LDP situation saying: “the people are disgusted by the condition where 
there are only factions but no country!” He gained more trust and support with his perception of the LDP politicians 
being more concerned with intra-party quarrels instead of taking seriously the problems that ordinary people faced.148 He 
developed a unique and aggressive populist stance towards his party. When he understood that the privatization bill might 
fail to pass the Diet, he threatened to dissolve the Diet.149
Koizumi had mainly focused on domestic issues during his political career, and he had less diplomatic experience.150 
However, he was one of the most active prime ministers in Japanese foreign affairs post-WWII. A day after his start-up as 
prime minister of Japan, on April 27,2001, Koizumi presented his views on foreign policy, Japan’s WWII responsibility and 
the U.S.-Japan relationship.151
“I believe that during the post-war period, in order for Japan to develop peacefully, the most important thing has been to reflect 
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first on the Second World War, from which has come the realization that Japan must never again wage war. A policy for the future of 
Japan of the utmost importance is how to encourage the creation of a peaceful and respectable nation, through endeavors of the people 
of Japan. If the question were to be directly asked as to why Japan plunged itself into war, I believe that the most appropriate answer 
would be to say that Japan isolated itself from the international community. In order to see to it that never again does Japan wage war, it 
is of the utmost importance that the country never again isolates itself from international cooperation and the international community. 
From this perspective, I consider the basis for the future of Japan's diplomacy to be the friendly functioning of the Japan-United States 
relationship, which to date has been the most important foundation from which Japan operates. While never forgetting this foundation 
of Japan's diplomacy, I am convinced that through friendly and close cooperation between Japan and the United States, we can create 
a cooperative structure with the other countries of the world. In particular, it is of the greatest importance to maintain close and warm 
relations with other countries in the region, including the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation. 
Founded on sound relations with these countries and the foundation provided by the Japan-U.S. relationship, I believe we can further 
improve and develop Japan's international relations, a point that should underpin Japan's diplomacy.”152
Executive leadership, along with outside expectations, played a critical role in shaping Tokyo’s contribution to the war on terror. 
Koizumi circumvented his government’s standard foreign policy-making procedures to expedite Japan’s antiterrorism contribution. The 
prime minister also used speeches and summit diplomacy to direct (internal pressure) naiatsu(内圧 ) against his opponents.153
Koizumi said in the Diet, “If I follow public opinion, I will make a mistake. Even though the majority of citizens do not 
understand my decision, I have to carry out the policy which needs to be implemented”.154 The coalition government passed 
the Iraq support in July 2003 authorizing dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq, which occurred in January 
2004.155
Koizumi has been eager to strengthen Japan’s alliance with the U.S., symbolized by his close personal relations with 
President Bush, as the cornerstone of his foreign policy. This stance has raised concerns that Koizumi is a captive to Bush’s 
controversial policies.156 By making personality an element in policy controversies, Koizumi has compelled his rivals 
to follow suit: they now must look beyond the advice of state bureaucrats and established interest groups for ideas and 
support.157
　2.2.3 Feeling of Shame 
 Shame might be a third factor. In essence, participation in the post-September 11 coalition can be seen as a way for 
Japan to recover from the shame it felt in the face of charges that the country had engaged in “checkbook diplomacy” 
during the Gulf War 1991.158 Japan’s provision of financial support rather than troops during the Gulf War had made it 
being described as a reactive state, passive in security policy, freeriding on US power, refusing to bear the responsibilities 
of an ally due to the constraints of Article 9 of its constitution.159 Probably the bitterest memory for many Japanese was 
Kuwait’s failure to include Japan in a list of allied countries it thanked for liberating the emirate, despite Tokyo’s $13 billion 
contribution to the war effort.160
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This sense of shame created a “never again” reflex, producing strong support for dispatching the SDF in 2001. A former 
Japanese diplomat, Okamoto Yukio, said that Japan was laughed off by the rest of the world as little more than a “cash 
dispenser”.161 Koizumi appointed Okamoto as a top foreign policy advisor, apparently because Koizumi shared Okamoto’s 
desire to prevent a repeat of the Gulf War debacle. Since his appointment, Okamoto has played a pivotal role in Koizumi’s 
post-September-11 foreign policy.162
There are several reasons helped the quick and easy passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law; Koizumi’s 
high popularity during his first nine months in office, his independence from the LDP’s Diet factions and strong support for 
Japan’s playing a larger military role.163 One of the results of the Gulf War itself is the apparent shift of public opinion in 
favor of overseas non-combat missions for the SDF, and even claim that Japanese mass opinion shared the sense of shame 
that elites felt for failing to dispatch the SDF to the Middle East in 1990. Japanese domestic opinion was more supportive in 
2001 than in 1990.164
Bush administration announced that it would exercise the right of self-defense by acting preemptively against threats of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism, advancing a hard-line policy that reserved the option of military action 
against Iraq. The U.S. government also stated that wars were best fought by “coalitions of the willing”.165
Before studying the stances of Japan regarding the U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2003 without a new U.N. resolution, it is 
necessary to review Japan’s stances regarding the past cases of Iraq since 1990:
When the Gulf War broke out in 1991, the Japanese government declared “firm support” for the U.S. based on Resolution 
678, which approved military action by the Multi-National Force.166 And when the U.S. and other countries launched strikes 
on Iraq in December 1998, the Japanese government supported the U.S. again, based on the same resolution.167 When the U.S. 
and other countries struck at Iraq in January 1993 and September 1996, respectively, the Japanese government supported 
the U.S. under the conditions that the military action be “limited” and a “necessary measure to maintain the performance of 
the U.N. resolution.168 But when the U.S. attacked Iraq in June 1993 and attack Afghanistan and the Sudan in August 1998, 
Japan refrained from directly supporting the U.S. because of doubts about the legality of these actions, stating only that “action 
was unavoidable and understandable.169
One can conclude that Japan’s 2003 declaration of support for the U.S., despite much debate over the legality of the war 
on Iraq in the first place, was a break from tradition.170 After the experience the Gulf War in 1991, Japan searched for a more 
active international security role through the dispatch of minesweepers to the Gulf and participation in U.N. peacekeeping 
operations.171 On April 26, 1991, five minesweepers and one supply ship from Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force set sail 
for the Middle East to participate in the cleanup of the Gulf in the aftermath of operation Desert Storm against Iraq. This 
dispatch was Japan’s way of making up to the United States for its failure to contribute military to the war against Saddam 
Hussein. This decision marked the country’s first military foray abroad since 1945.172
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3. The Nature of the Task of JSDF
After July 2003, the security situation in Iraq witnessed more deterioration. An attack on Italian troops in Nasariya 
in mid-November, which killed 18 soldiers, appeared to be a deliberate attempt to target non-American coalition forces. 
Nasariya is only 50 miles east of the town of Samawah, the proposed Japanese deployment site.173 Later in the month, al-
Qaeda warned Japan that its troops would be a target of retaliation if it sent to Iraq. Furthermore, Japanese opinion was 
unsettled by the assassination of two of its diplomats in Iraq on November 29, 2003, on their way to a reconstruction 
conference in Tikrit when they were ambushed.174
In early December, Japanese government released detailed guidelines for the eventual deployment of 1,000 SDF personnel. Japan 
would send 550 soldiers from the Ground Self-Defense Force who were authorized to carry sidearms, machine guns, and antitank rocket 
launchers. These troops were to be augmented by 300 sailors and five or six ships from the Maritime Self-Defense force, plus 150 
members of the Air Self-Defense Force, along with four military transport planes. The main area of deployment for the ground troops 
was to be in Samawah, but other Japanese forces were to be based near the Baghdad International Airport.175
Koizumi was not able to let the SDF participate in the wartime operations. Nor was he able to let the SDF participate in policing 
and security measures. Instead, the SDF participated only in humanitarian relief and reconstruction work in a post-war situation. Due 
to strict limitations on the use of force, the SDF was protected by other countries’ military engagement in Iraq; first the Dutch, then the 
Australians.176
Economically, compared to Japan’s $13 billion financial contribution following the Gulf War, SDF dispatch to Iraq has 
occurred on the cheap: the SDF’s activities in Samawah cost approximately $120 million per year.177
At a press conference on December 9, 2003, Koizumi expressed: “First of all, this dispatch of SDF is for humanitarian 
and reconstruction assistance in Iraq. They will not engage in the use of force. They will not participate in combative 
activities. They are not going to war.” He continues with a legitimation of SDF dispatch on the basis of the international 
community178:
“Indeed, I believe that the international community is calling upon Japan, and the people of Japan to act in accordance with 
the ideals of our Constitution. I call upon the members of the SDF to undertake activities that conform to the spirit and ideals of 
the Constitution. This is fully justified and shows the fact that we are not thinking only of our nation. The stability and peaceful 
development of Iraq is essential for Iraq itself, as well as necessary for Japan. Indeed, it is necessary for the security of the world179”. 
Now, asking me, for the sake of realizing world peace and security, I believe that it is not a question of sakoku 鎖国 or opening up the 
country, but instead whether standing-alone-pacifism ikkoku heiwa shugi 一国平和主義 is good or that international cooperation is 
good. I think Japan alone is not able to preserve Japan’s security.180
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　3.1 The role of Cabinet Secretariat to initiate security policies
The Cabinet Secretariat has been playing an important role in Japan’s policymaking. It is defined as the “final organ” of 
the Japanese government for policy coordination.181 Politically difficult issues are brought to the Secretariat to be coordinated 
and resolved under the leadership of the prime minister and the Chief of Cabinet Secretariat.182 The former chief of Cabinet 
Secretariat Gotoda Masaharu summarizes his old job as “to mediate and settle disputes” among various government 
agencies in the policy-making process.183 The administrative reforms passed in July 1999 and the institutional changes have 
strengthened the power and function of the Cabinet Secretariat. This body plays an instrumental role as “core executive”184 
and has been considered equivalent to the U.S. White House or the British Prime Minister’s Office.185
In terms of the mechanism of drafting laws, coordination among ministries and leadership, the position of the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary (CCS) is very important. Article 9 of the Cabinet Law stipulates that “if the prime minister is absent 
or has an accident, a state minister designated by him in advance shall assume the duties as prime minister as a tentative 
measure.”186 The CCS is always at the top of the list and will continue to be so unless the position of the deputy prime 
minister is officially introduced.187
The position of the administrative deputy CCS is also vital as it has five major functions: (1) policy coordination, (2) handling 
issues brought to cabinet meetings, (3) chairing sub-cabinet meetings, (4) screening appointments of high officials, and (5) advising vice 
ministers.188
 The parliamentary deputies CCS are often chosen from the prime minister’s faction and serve a different function from 
that of the administrative one. Their tasks vary depending on their interests and expertise. Mr. Abe Shinzo (2000–03), for 
example, spent most of his time dealing with foreign affairs and national security issues.189 Although the parliamentary 
deputy CCS is a sub-cabinet position, the post is often more important in terms of policymaking than some cabinet positions 
are. This is why senior LDP members with prior cabinet experience were sometimes appointed to the post.190
In order to clarify and strengthen the premier’s authority in terms of proposing important, basic policies at the Cabinet 
meetings, the Cabinet Law had been revised many times. The authority and function of the Cabinet Secretariat were 
also reinforced.191 In May 2000, a Cabinet decision was issued to instruct other ministries to recognize that ‘the Cabinet 
Secretariat is the highest and final organ for policy coordination under the Cabinet.192 The revised law allows the Secretariat 
to initiate policies by clearly providing the authority to “plan and draft” under the direction of the cabinet and the prime 
minister.193 The policy coordination system guidelines which is approved by the cabinet in May 2000, places the Cabinet 
Secretariat above other ministries and agencies. Statutorily, the prime minister and the cabinet can initiate and proceed with 
policy processes independently from the relevant ministries and the Cabinet Secretariat can finalize policy coordination with 
stronger legal authority.194
The Cabinet Secretariat successfully promulgated, and has been administering, 12 more major laws under the Koizumi 
Cabinet, as of September 2005. Six laws are directly related to national security.195 The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures 
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Law (promulgated on October 29, 2001), The Iraq Special Measures Law (August 1, 2003)196 were among them. The 
antiterrorism legislation was a smooth passage for a major law allowing Japan to dispatch SDF units abroad in times of 
combat for the first time.197
After passage of the anti-terrorism legislation, Prime Minister Koizumi tried to take advantage of the momentum to pass the contingency 
legislation, which would provide a framework for dealing with an emergency in case of a military attack on Japan but this legislation had been 
opposed strongly by the opposition parties arguing that such legislation would be a step toward Japan’s remilitarization.198
Prime Minister Koizumi has competent assistants in his office; Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda and his deputy 
Shinzo Abe. These two politicians have provided necessary and political advice and made competent decisions when 
needed.199 Shinzo Abe served as assistant to his father, Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe in the early 1980s, and is very familiar 
with foreign policy issues.200
The proposed bills ( for dispatching SDF to Afghanistan and Iraq) clarified the government’s decision-making process, 
strengthened the authority of the prime minister, facilitated action by the Self-Defense Forces, and limited personal rights in 
case of emergency.201 In both legislations, the Koizumi administration followed the same strategy. The same task force within 
the Cabinet Secretariat drafted the contingency bills. For the bill for Afghanistan, a combined 90% of the Diet members who 
attended voted for it which is considered as one of the most controversial pieces of legislation in Japan’s postwar history. The 
legislation for dispatching SDF to Iraq passed the Diet in July 2003, and Tokyo dispatched its forces in February 2004.202
　3.2 Bottom – Top Policy at the government and the LDP
Traditionally, Japan adopts bottom-up system policy process for legislation laws, in which the bureaucrats in the 
ministries play a central role with the governing coalition or the governing political party to negotiate with them.203
When the prime minister did provide policy direction, he instructed the related Cabinet minister. The minister in turn gave 
instructions to his vice minister, the bureau chief, and the director of the related section. If an officer in the chain of command 
sabotaged the measure, however, the policy did not survive.204 ‘The bureau meetings are the actual decision-making organ within the 
bureaucracy”.205
There are many official meetings at higher levels before the Cabinet meetings on the levels of ministry meetings, 
administrative vice-ministerial meetings. However, the steps of the policy process taken after the bureau meeting are really 
nothing more than confirmation.206
On the party level, the bottom-up policy process also existed. The LDP’s Policy Research Council had 13 subcommittees 
and more than 30 research commissions.207  Traditionally, the subcommittees served as the first forum the government 
consulted on a proposal.208 Since the LDP controlled the government for a long time after the war, an approval at the 
subcommittee level was virtually the same to the bureaucrats as a de facto approval in the Diet.209 Once the subcommittee 
（アルジェセリー　ラハマン
　　　　ロアン　ムフシン）研究ノート　　
論文の和文日本の戦後における政治的イデオロギー闘争と憲法上の議論：
日本の外交政策形成の中心的焦点としての 2004 年イラクへの自衛隊派遣について
553
approved a policy, it was brought to the full Policy Research Council, and finally to the LDP General Council, where the 
decision had to be unanimous.210
　3.3 Koizumi’s top-down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq
Koizumi’s policy strategy was top-down in the sense that the policy proposals were produced in cooperation between the 
kantei官邸 (prime minister office) and the cabinet and with input from external non-parliamentary committees.211 Koizumi 
sought to keep the bureaucracy outside the policy preparation process.212
Koizumi inherited a political system that so inhibited a prime minister’s power it had been called an ‘Un-Westminster’ system with 
a ‘leadership deficit’. But by the time Koizumi led his party to a stunning and overwhelming victory in the September 2005 general 
election, he had moved Japan closer to a top-down ‘Westminster’ model of cabinet government than at any time in the post-war era.213
Westminster system centralizes power in the hands of the party leadership and prime minister. Call it the Britannicization 
of Japan.214
In Westminister systems, the ‘Cabinet under the prime minister conducts substantive policy debate and takes charge of 
policymaking. Ministers both collectively in Cabinet and individually as heads of ministries are the source and authority of 
all major government policies.’215 Ruling party members outside the government have little direct influence on the policy 
making. The Japanese bureaucracy has ‘formidable control over the function of policy advice, initiation, formulation and 
implementation. The ruling party, not the executive, is the only political institution with sufficient power to bargain and 
negotiate with bureaucrats.’ In Japan’s ‘Un-Westminster’ system216, the role of the prime minister and his Cabinet is very 
limited.217
In the pre-Koizumi era, Japan has had a very weak Cabinet that simply rubber-stamped decisions made by others. Any 
legislative proposal to reach the level of Cabinet endorsement and thence to the Diet floor had to be approved by all relevant 
LDP committees, among them, most importantly, the seisakuchosakai 政策調査会 (Policy Affairs Research Committee), 
its bukai 部 会 (subcommittees), and the Somukai 総 務 会 (General Affairs Committee).218 Koizumi has been successful 
in his attempts to centralize the party. Throughout his term, he has been a tactful strategist and a great campaigner.219 It 
was Koizumi who smashed long-standing taboos and created the conditions for ending Japan’s foreign and security policy 
inertia.220 
He challenged the status quo according to the un-Westminster system and ignored the unwritten rules. He simply decided that 
a majority vote sufficed to determine the collective will of the Somukai 総務会 (General Affairs Committee), thereby stripping his 
opponents of the veto power that the unanimity rule had afforded them.221
The steps that Koizumi took were all intended to centralize the decision-making structure of the LDP.222 Without a doubt, 
factions habatsu 派閥 have been decisively weakened under Koizumi.223 Immediately following the 2005 elections, Koizumi 
succeeded in imposing a term limit on chairman positions for LDP committees.224 Koizumi became LDP president on the 
basis of the popular vote of LDP supporters, so he has the legitimacy that he utilized against his intraparty opponents.225
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Koizumi has shown that the new rules of the game have transformed the formal prerogatives of the LDP president and prime 
minister into real sources of power. Koizumi’s success has established the importance of the party leader at the electoral polls. 
Maintaining a popular leader who can communicate policy goals to voters benefits everyone in the party. Because they lack the kind 
of party loyalty characteristic of old-fashioned organized interests, unorganized voters’ support is easier to win over but also harder to 
keep.226
Koizumi implemented a new form of ‘top-down’ decision-making in foreign policy by using the strengthened institutions 
of the prime minister’s office, and bypassing traditional consensus building within the Liberal Democratic Party and amongst 
the central ministries.227 During his era, most key foreign-policy initiatives were taken by the prime minister, the chief 
cabinet secretary, with occasional input from trusted confidants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries.228
After 11 September 2001, Koizumi showed a strong inclination to gamble in foreign policy; the Diet passed an Anti-
Terrorism Law by October 2001 dispatching the MSDF and ASDF to the Indian Ocean to support the U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan.229 The legislation required only three weeks of debate to pass both houses, compared with months for previous 
security legislation. In the wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq, Koizumi gambled again enacting legislation to dispatch 
Ground, Air and Maritime Self Defense Forces to Iraq.230
Koizumi administration seemed ready for the war in Iraq. In his reaction to the invasion, Koizumi held at the same day 
of the beginning of the operations on 20 March 2003, a Security Council meeting, and decided upon an Action Guideline.231
Immediately after this meeting, Koizumi held an emergency Cabinet meeting to decide on the establishment of a ‘Policy Measures 
Headquarters on the Problem of Iraq’ in the Cabinet. Following the Cabinet meeting, he immediately held the first meeting of this newly 
established headquarters to decide: to provide assistance to countries neighboring Iraq; to strengthen Japan’s support in the fight against 
terrorism in Afghanistan and other areas; and to prepare new legislation to enable Japan to contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq. 
These swift and smooth reactions showed clearly demonstrated Koizumi’s determination. The policy-making process was initiated by 
the Cabinet Secretariat. Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary was instructed to form a team to prepare legislation. A dozen officials from 
the MOFA, JDA, and other agencies were gathered in the Cabinet Office building. MOFA’s headquarters on this policy matter were 
the National Security Division of Foreign Policy Bureau, the United Nations Policy Division of the same bureau, and the Legal Affairs 
Division of Treaty Bureau. The Iraq legislation was prepared in the framework of international collaboration, not in the framework of 
the US-Japan alliance. As for preparation for legislation, the SDF (Ground, Maritime, and Air) played a subordinate role.232
　3.4 The role of the Opposition Parties towards the SDF Participation 
As the war against Iraq started, DPJ members argued that continued inspections in Iraq might have peacefully disarmed 
Saddam’s regime. Many also considered the U.S. attack illegitimate given the absence of a new UN resolution.233 However, 
opposition to deploying the SDF was neither uniform nor solely inspired by a divergent outlook on the legitimacy of the war. 
Some members of the DPJ not only supported SDF involvement in the rebuilding of Iraq but actually, attended the farewell 
ceremony for SDF personnel deployed to Iraq. Observers considered these cleavages were generational234. Moreover, the 
oppositions parties (the DPJ in particular) may have opposed the dispatch partly on the grounds of domestic politics and 
needed to differentiate itself from the LDP in the November 2003 Lower House election. The DPJ members were betting 
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that the possible SDF casualties in Iraq would provoke a public backlash against the LDP-led government. Therefore, the 
DPJ vocally opposed an SDF role in Iraq reconstruction.235
The debates over dispatching troops to Iraq among the political parties focused more on policy timing and procedures than on the 
more fundamental constitutional challenge. The opposition parties criticized the PM for blindly endorsing Bush’s war, questioned his 
judgment over the alleged presence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and argued that sending troops would violate the 
Iraq special law’s provision that troops can only be sent to “non-combat zones. The DPJ’s success in the November election, spurred 
in part by its opposition to dispatching the SDF, led many to assume that Koizumi would move more cautiously on his deployment 
plans.236
The DPJ desired to be counted as a responsible party in foreign affairs, and therefore, the DPJ presented their own Iraq 
legislation. The DPJ wanted the legislation to be based on UN Security Council Resolution 1483 where the UN requested 
that the international community support Iraq’s reconstruction instead of including resolution 678, 687 and 1441 as the LDP 
did.237 The three latter resolutions “legitimized” the American attack on Iraq.238
The DPJ has insisted that the SDF should go only as part of a peacekeeping force under U.N. command. Thus, the party 
has parted ways from the traditional Left parties that deem any such activity unconstitutional.239 The Japan Communist Party 
(JCP) continues to call for the complete implementation of Article 9, for a staged process of military reductions, and for 
disbanding the SDF.240
Reflecting its religious base, Komeito 公 明 党 maintains strong pacifist rhetoric in its manifesto, but it has compromised 
significantly on security policy in return for entry to the ruling coalition. It supported dispatch of the SDF to the Middle East, acquiesced 
to LDP plans to elevate the JDA to ministry status, and supports debate on constitutional revision.241
　3.5 SDF participation in Iraq and Japanese public attitudes 
The opportunity for SDF participation in peacekeeping operations increased PKOs after 1990. Such participation 
provided Japan a politically acceptable way to participate in international security.242 Japan’s constitutional constraints on 
participation diminished and the possibilities for participation expanded. Public opinion still preferred minor changes in 
security policy and limited non-combat roles for the SDF in PKOs.243
In order to explain the impact of public opinion on foreign policy, there are two approaches: The elitist approach and the pluralist 
approach. The first one argues that public attitudes are inherently uninformed, incoherent, and unstable, and thus irrelevant to explaining 
foreign policy outcomes and subject to easy manipulation at the hands of foreign policy elites. While the pluralist approach sees public 
opinion as stable and composed of rational and coherent foreign policy views.244
Japanese public opinion supports military power to defend Japan’s sovereignty and territory, and the citizens are not 
pacifist as conventional wisdom might hold but they worry about deploying or using military force outside Japan because of 
the scourge of World War II.245
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Japan’s defensive posture has in large part been shaped by Japanese public opinion, which has in general been distrustful in the 
postwar period of the state’s ability to control the military and consequently remained opposed to the deployment of the JSDF for 
combat operations and ultimately restrained the policymakers, who are careful to avoid provoking opposition to its policies.246
It is widely accepted that pacifist public opinion had prevented the Japan from taking an active security role in the 
international community. The public opinion was a very important factor in the national security policymaking under the 
Koizumi administration.247
Compared to the North Korea issue, the Iraq debate was more heated among intellectuals than with the general public. Tokyo saw 
no massive anti-war demonstrations comparable to those in European capitals; support for sending Self-Defense Forces was surprisingly 
high. The Asahi newspaper’s polls, taken monthly from December 2003 to March 2004, show support and (opposition) at 34 (55), 40 
(48), 44 (48), and 42 (41)%, respectively.248
After September 11, 2001 there was very little public support for SDF participation in overseas combat operations. A 
Nippon Television poll in mid-September 2001 found that only 8% of respondents supported such participation.249 A poll 
at the end of the month found that 46% opposed Koizumi’s plan for sending the SDF to the Arabian Sea, versus 42% who 
supported it.250
Once it became clear that the SDF would not be deployed anywhere near a combat zone and would indeed only engage in non-
combat operations, support increased. A poll in late January 2002 revealed that 64% of Japanese supported the non-combat dispatch of 
the SDF to the Indian Ocean, versus 23% who were opposed.251
In spite of the fact that grass-roots groups were not close from the parties regarding the war and persist in efforts to 
promote pacifism but their movements reflected regional solidarity more than the country pacifism.252 In 2001, 25,000 
people gathered to protest Prime Minister Koizumi's support of the "revengeful war" in Afghanistan by the United States- 
just 10 percent of the crowds that gathered in 1960 to protest revision of the security treaty.253 In 2002, only three gatherings 
attracted more than 10,000 participants, and Japanese protest of the Iraq invasion in 2003 paled in comparison to that in the 
world's other democracies. By 2004, antiwar protests focused on the U.S. bases, but the pacifists were more out of step, and 
more marginalized, than ever.254
Summary 
Although the 11 September 2001 attacks on U.S. and the wars in Iraq 1990 and 2003 transformed Japan’s domestic and 
international environment, providing with unprecedented opportunity to launch high-profile initiatives to expand Japan’s 
international military role, the general trend of the security policies has not deviated from the traditional. This is due to 
the complex nature of the relationship between Japan and the United States, domestic politics (political parties and public 
opinion), the continuous debate over Article 9 of the Constitution.
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Prime Minister Koizumi provoked widespread controversy in his domestic policies and decisions in his quest to 
strengthen the relationship between Japan and the United States, but this quest did not pay off. US pressures on Japan has 
been still continuing over many issues such as burdens of the US troops on the Japanese territories, the security treaty as 
“one-sided”, trade agreements and calling to change the constitution as well as the participation of SDF with the coalitions to 
provide security of the sea lanes.
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution does not mention self-defense or collective self-defense. Even the success of the 
Japanese government in 2014 in reinterpreting the Article 9 to enable it to exercise collective self-defense is not considered 
as a substitute for an amendment the article to suit the pursuit of a more effective role at the regional and international level, 
especially matters related to international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.
Border problems with Japan's neighbors, the dispute over islands and China's political and military emergence, as well as 
the heavy legacy of pre-World War II history put more pressures on Japanese policies, requiring a redoubling of diplomatic 
efforts to gain more confidence to accommodate these impacts. Such efforts will help the regional countries' understanding 
of the security and constitutional steps that the ruling LDP is working on.
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